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Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict signals a new geopolitical equation in South Asia

Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict have escalated in recent weeks. Meanwhile, Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has visited India. With both China and the US maintaining strong interests in this region, these developments raise a key question -- are we witnessing a new geopolitical equation emerging in South Asia? Political analyst Altaf Parvez, who specialises in South Asian affairs, shared his views with The Daily Star.TDS: What lies behind this renewed conflict? Is there a deeper id...

NP
Published: October 19, 2025, 10:31 PM
Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict signals a new geopolitical equation in South Asia

Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict have escalated in recent weeks. Meanwhile, Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has visited India. With both China and the US maintaining strong interests in this region, these developments raise a key question -- are we witnessing a new geopolitical equation emerging in South Asia? Political analyst Altaf Parvez, who specialises in South Asian affairs, shared his views with The Daily Star.

TDS: What lies behind this renewed conflict? Is there a deeper ideological factor?

Altaf: The immediate cause is the rise of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). However, such conflicts were inevitable and will likely continue, rooted in historical factors dating back to December 1979, when Russian troops entered Afghanistan to support the communist government during the Cold War.

The US could not accept the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. To counter it, Washington relied on Pakistan under Zia-ul-Haq, and together with Saudi Arabia, they launched a proxy war against the Russians. They provided weapons, training, and infused a jihadist ideology among young Afghans.

Over the next four decades, the Afghan Mujahideen fought -- and the Taliban later emerged as their new version. That long project, involving intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the US, ended in August 2021 when the Taliban captured Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, many fighters and Mujahideen remained in Pakistan's Pashtun regions, especially Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These Pashto-speaking areas became the Taliban's main support bases. The Pashtuns in Pakistan aspired to create a government and society similar to Afghanistan's. They eventually formed the TTP -- an alliance of about ten organisations, including leaders from tribal groups, Sharia-based parties, foreign fighters, and Pashtun nationalists.

Now, the TTP is fighting against the Pakistani state, which blames Afghanistan for sheltering them. But Kabul insists the TTP are Pakistan's own people. This is a tragedy for Pakistan -- many current Taliban leaders were once Pakistani protégés who fought against the Soviets and later NATO. Having expelled those foreign powers, they are now fighting Islamabad.

TDS: The Durand Line border dispute has persisted for over a century. Why does it remain unresolved?

Altaf: South Asia was historically a collection of small states. When the British left, they created two countries -- India and Pakistan -- and drew the 1,600-mile border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It's an artificial boundary that split the Pashtun people -- some in Pakistan, some in Afghanistan, and some even in Iran.

The Pashtuns reject this imposed border and believe in a historic homeland called Pashtunistan. The current conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan -- including the TTP's movement -- is partly rooted in this rejection of the Durand Line.

TDS: Afghanistan claims it does not support or shelter groups that destabilise other countries. What's the reality?

Altaf: The Afghan Taliban and Pakistan's TTP fought side by side until August 2021. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa served as their common training ground and sanctuary. Gradually, the TTP built a foothold inside Afghanistan. Since both share the same ideology, it's difficult for the Afghan Taliban to turn against their old comrades.

TDS: What are the core features of this ideology?

Altaf: The TTP seeks to establish a Sharia-based system in Pakistan -- essentially replicating Afghanistan's model. Failing that, they at least aim to control the North-West Frontier Province.

TDS: Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Muttaqi recently visited India, signalling growing ties. What is India trying to achieve?

Altaf: When the Taliban took control of Kabul in August 2021, Indian diplomats and professionals had to leave. For Pakistan, that was a success -- it wanted India out of Afghanistan. But it was also a humiliation for India. Pakistan has always considered Afghanistan a "red line" -- a country that must remain within its sphere of influence. After 40 years of involvement there, Islamabad hoped to have a government completely friendly to it.

However, India waited patiently for an opportunity to re-enter. When tensions rose between Kabul and Islamabad, Afghanistan smartly extended a hand of friendship to India -- and India immediately accepted. Muttaqi's seven-day visit to India marked this shift. Interestingly, he grew up in Pakistan, studied there, and even owns property in Karachi -- yet now he's strengthening ties with New Delhi. India has announced plans to reopen its embassy in Kabul, marking its return to Afghanistan -- a major diplomatic setback for Pakistan.

TDS: But what is India's ultimate goal?

Altaf: Before 2021, India had invested over $3 billion in Afghanistan. It will try to recover that and also use Afghanistan as a bridge to Iran's Chabahar Port and onward to Central Asia and Russia.

By applying the principle of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend", India will use the Afghan-Pakistan conflict to corner Pakistan on multiple fronts. If Pakistan must deploy massive forces along its 2,000-mile Afghan border, its attention on the Indian frontier will inevitably weaken -- a clear strategic advantage for India. Additionally, many leaders of the current Afghan government were educated in Deobandi-style madrasas in Pakistan. India, which also has numerous Deobandi institutions, may use this connection to build soft ideological influence across South Asia, including Bangladesh.

TDS: But the BJP's ideology contradicts Deoband thought, doesn't it?

Altaf: Absolutely. The RSS -- the ideological parent of the BJP -- views Christians, Communists, and Muslims as adversaries. Yet, India is engaging the Taliban purely on the basis of national interest.

In modern diplomacy, ideology often takes a back seat to strategy. India sees practical gains in befriending the Taliban government and isn't viewing this through an ideological lens.

TDS: Does the Taliban's ideology have any influence in Bangladesh?

Altaf: During the 1979 Soviet invasion, when the Mujahideen fought with support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the US, many Bangladeshis joined them. When they returned, they brought that training and ideology home. Its traces were seen later in Bangladesh's socio-political sphere. Recently, reports suggest some Bangladeshis are fighting for the TTP, and a few have died. This is worrying for Bangladesh, because improved India-Afghanistan ties could make cross-border extremist movement easier.

TDS: Pakistan has a powerful military. Why can't it control the TTP?

Altaf: Pakistan is simultaneously facing guerrilla wars in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa while keeping large troop deployments along the Indian border, including in Kashmir. Recently, Afghanistan claimed it killed 58 Pakistani soldiers in a single attack. In effect, Pakistan is fighting on four fronts.

The TTP, however, is more organised and better trained than the Baloch insurgents, and they know the mountainous terrain along the Durand Line far better than the Pakistani army. Islamabad also accuses India of aiding the Baloch -- and if India's ties with Kabul deepen, this may further strengthen Baloch resistance.

TDS: Afghanistan's economy is fragile and remains unrecognised internationally. What lies ahead?

Altaf: Afghanistan's economic recovery depends heavily on good relations with Pakistan, its main trading partner. It also needs stable ties with Iran, though that border too faces tensions. Pakistan's restrictions on border trade will hurt Afghanistan's economy. Meanwhile, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Balochistan is at risk from the growing instability in the region. Several Chinese nationals have already been killed in attacks, raising Beijing's alarm. If violence spreads in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan, investment will vanish from the entire region, stalling China's plan to extend CPEC into Afghanistan. This could lead to a sharp decline in regional prosperity.

TDS: US-Pakistan relations seem to be warming again. What's driving that?

Altaf: Indeed, it's a dramatic turn. Many believe the US recently leaned toward Pakistan -- with Trump even playing a role in de-escalating tensions during the last India-Pakistan flare-up. Washington now wants to leverage this relationship to regain regional footholds, possibly even seeking access to an Afghan airbase like Bagram. The aim would be to monitor or counter China's growing presence.

TDS: Could the US really regain Bagram Air Base?

Altaf: In today's fluid geopolitics, many impossibilities are becoming possible. Few imagined that Afghanistan and Pakistan would become adversaries, or that the Taliban would cultivate ties with India.

If Washington does return, it would likely be to counter China. The real challenge for Pakistan will be balancing its ties with both the US and China -- a risky tightrope indeed.

TDS: Under these realities, can India achieve its goals?

Altaf: That depends on how the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship evolves. If peace returns, India's influence may plateau. But if tensions persist, as seems likely, India-Afghanistan ties will only deepen.

TDS: So, is a new geopolitical dimension unfolding among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India -- and what does it mean for the rest of South Asia?

Altaf: Indeed. A new Cold War between the US and China has already taken shape, and South Asia has become one of its key battlegrounds. The civil war in Myanmar, instability along the Arakan-Bangladesh border, and now the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict -- all are linked to this broader contest. The instability once confined to Afghanistan is now spilling into Pakistan and even parts of India, such as Ladakh and Manipur. These are early signs -- the tip of the iceberg. Greater turbulence in international relations is inevitable.

TDS: You mentioned that Pakistan's own policy toward the Taliban has backfired. What lesson should we take from this?

Altaf: Afghanistan's natural cultural ties are with Central Asia -- Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan -- not with Pakistan or India. Those countries are peaceful, stable, and nearly fully literate. Afghanistan, in contrast, has a literacy rate of only 30-40 percent, and women's education is almost banned. Instead of helping Afghans build education, health, or infrastructure, the world urged them to fight wars. As a result, Afghanistan has fallen decades behind. Today, investments flow into Central Asia, not Afghanistan, because of stability and skilled workforce. Had peace prevailed, Afghanistan could have become the "Switzerland of Asia." The Afghan policy of Pakistan, the US, Saudi Arabia, and NATO has been disastrous -- it has devastated Afghanistan, now threatens Pakistan, and endangers all of South Asia.

TDS: What would be your suggestion for the region?

Altaf: Regional economic integration is extremely weak. If South Asian states could resist foreign interference and instead revive SAARC as a genuine platform, many issues -- from Kashmir to TTP -- could be addressed collectively. Unfortunately, SAARC is dysfunctional. When regional problems are left unresolved, they invite external meddling, making them even more complex. I would really expect the South Asian countries to talk among themselves and solve their own problems.